Inquiry, Truth, Science, Law—and Humor: Susan Haack talks with Hilal Uney

HU: In your paper, “Serious Philosophy”, what did you mean by using the word “serious,” and how do you approach humor in philosophy? Should it be included or not? Do you agree that to be serious, a philosopher must be humorless?

SH: The answer to your last question, as I said very clearly in the article to which you refer, is emphatically, “no.”

I take philosophy to be a form of inquiry—into the world, how we know it, how we should best live in it, etc. So by “serious philosophy” I mean philosophy seriously undertaken, in the spirit of really trying to figure things out; not, for example, seeking a politically convenient answer, or an answer that will flatter the Big Noise in your field, or an answer plausible enough and fast enough that you can publish an article on it in time for this year’s annual report.

In Spanish, the phrase would be “filosofía en serio,” philosophy undertaken seriously, for real: which is less apt to convey the false impression that serious philosophy must be solemn or self-important. As I said, nothing could be further from the truth. Solemnity, self-importance, what Peirce calls “the vanity of cleverness,” all get in the way And a sense of humor can actually help, e.g. by preventing you from being over-impressed by others’ —or your own!—over-ambitious claims and ideas. Moreover, a kind of playfulness, allowing ideas to come freely—Peirce calls it “musement”—is an important part of the early stages of serious inquiry.

I’m not quite sure why you had to ask this question, because the answer is given unmistakably clearly in the article to which you refer, as are my reasons.

HU: In a marvellous metaphor, Peirce says that the serious philosopher needs “intentness in the eye” and “energy in the arm.”What does he mean?

SH: Peirce is thinking of an archer drawing his bow. The philosopher needs to focus on the target, the truth of the question that concerns him, and not to be distracted by irrelevant considerations—that’s “intentness in the eye”; and he needs to pull hard, to do his level best to hit the truth squarely and solidly—that’s “energy in the arm.” So Peirce’s metaphor conveys two key points: the philosopher must really want the truth, not some passable substitute; and he must really want the truth, not just vaguely wish he had it.

HU: But is it really possible to reach “the truth” given the uncertainty of our perceptions? Even if we don’t perceive it, does the “truth” exist independently of our perceptions and their context?

SH: I don’t know why you put “truth” in scare quotes, as if the concept were somehow illegitimate. It isn’t. And I don’t think you really believe it is, either, since you are asking me a bunch of questions—which would make no sense unless there were true answers!

Granted, our perceptual judgments (not our perceptions, which are events, not propositional, and so are neither true nor false, and neither fallible nor infallible) can be mistaken, i.e., they are indeed fallible. But this doesn’t mean we can never reach the truth; it means only that we need to take account of the uncertainty of those judgments, the circumstances of perception, the background beliefs that may be skewing our expectations, and so on—as every responsible inquirer routinely does.

And, yes: most truths are indeed true independently of what we perceive or what we believe. That is precisely what I mean by saying that truth is objective. (Even the truth that I believe that truth is objective is objective, though it is a truth about what I believe—for I might not really believe what I find it convenient to think I do.)

HU: If the “Will to Learn” is the essential spirit of serious inquiry, how can we follow this will by empirical ways or by thinking? How can human beings pursue their wish to discover the truth of the universe in which they live?

SH: It depends, obviously, on what aspect of reality we want to figure out: a fact or law about the physical world, a fact or law about the social world, some historical question, a mathematical conjecture, etc. Different ways of inquiring are appropriate to each.

HU: What changes could be made at universities to encourage faculty to find the truth? Do you really think that universities are the place for free thought, or it is a political illusion they want us to believe?

SH: Well, universities aren’t the same everywhere; and I really don’t know anything about how they are run in Turkey. So I can’t give you a generic answer; but I can say something about the situation in the U.S.

One big problem for us, I think, is that universities, once run by faculty, are now “managed” by a large, and constantly growing, class of academic administrators—vast numbers of bureaucrats with little or no knowledge of what the life of the mind is like—i.e., of what it means to aim seriously at the truth. Some universities now have even more administrators than teachers! These “managers” think of faculty as “employees” (not as the soul of the university); and judge them by their “productivity,” as if they were building automobiles or making widgets. In practice what this means is that administrators judge us by how much written research we produce, how highly the places where we publish are ranked, how highly our department is ranked, and—especially in the sciences—how much grant money we bring in.

Faculty anxious about getting tenure, a raise, or a promotion gradually adapt, eventually internalizing these distorted “administrative” values. Moreover, when they hire new professors, they hire those who seem able to succeed by these standards; and when they train graduate students, they train them to succeed in these ways. And so the disaster feeds on itself, and the situation gets worse and worse; the old academic values are forgotten as everyone obsesses over rankings, grants, citation counts, and the like.

HU: Is the scientific attitude really useful to reach truth via experiments or empirical ways? Or is science, as you once wrote, “just a kind of confidence the trick, nothing more than power, politics, and rhetoric,” a tool manipulated by politics and economics?

SH: Let me start with this idea that I might think that I ever suggested that science is a confidence trick, or the tool of the powerful. Nothing could be further from the truth. On the contrary, I say quite explicitly, in more than one place, that science is neither sacred nor a confidence trick.

Science is a human enterprise; and, like all human enterprises, it is thoroughly fallible and susceptible to corruption. But that certainly doesn’t mean there has been no good, solid, serious scientific work, or no real scientific discoveries. Of course there has. Think how much more we now know about the world now, thanks to the sciences, than we did, say, 400 years ago. As Peirce says, “a man must be downright crazy to doubt that science has made many true discoveries.” (Or a woman!)

I also think that you have misinterpreted what Peirce means by the “scientific attitude,” which is, simply, a commitment to getting the truth. Moreover, while Peirce also talks about the “scientific method,” and urges that philosophers adopt it, it’s perfectly clear that what he means is simply “the method of experience and reasoning,” and that his point is that philosophy isn’t purely a priori. But this is not to say that, like the sciences, it should rely on experiments, expeditions, etc. On the contrary, Peirce makes quite explicit that philosophy does not require recherché experience, as the sciences do; it requires close attention to aspects of everyday experience so familiar that we are barely aware of them.

HU: Doesn’t the claim that science sometimes succeeds in discovering how the world is depend on the modernist approach, as Foucault and other post-modernists asserted; isn’t everything ideological, even science, because it was formed by individual’s backgrounds such as education, curiosity, concerns, beliefs, etc.? What do you think?

SH: I don’t think the distinction of the “modern” versus the “post-modern,” or the allusion to Foucault, is at all helpful here; nor do I think that “everything is ideological.” And neither do you, not really; or you wouldn’t ask this question. To be sure, what questions a scientist works on may depend on his interests and background; but, if he’s honest both with himself and with others, what answers he reaches won’t be.

HU: Why is the interaction of science and law problematic, because of their different goals or the ways they treat evidence?

SH: The answer is, emphatically, “Both.” Yes, they have different goals: science seeks significant, explanatory truths about the world, however long that takes; law tries to make fair, reasonable, liveable decisions about various disputes within a restricted time-frame.

Of course, how the law goes about this varies depending on the system in question: there are many, many different legal systems. Those in the West fall into two broad classes: common-law systems (U.K., U.S., Canada, Australia, New Zealand, etc.) and civil-law systems (continental Europe, Latin America, etc.) The former use juries; the latter rely on judges to determine factual as well as legal questions.

All have some rules about burden of proof (which side must produce evidence in order to prevail) and standard of proof (how strong the evidence needs to be). In U.S. law, as in all common-law systems, the burden of proof in criminal cases is on the prosecution, and the standard of proof is “beyond a reasonable doubt”; in civil cases, the burden is on the plaintiff, and the standard is “by a preponderance of the evidence.” Such systems also impose various restrictions on what evidence, even relevant evidence, may be presented to fact-finders: not hearsay, for example, because the person who supposedly said whatever it is can’t be cross-examined. In civil-law systems, by contrast, all relevant evidence is usually admissible, and it is up to the judge—not, as in common-law systems, to a jury—to sort it out.

Scientists, by contrast, are obviously exempt from such rules. The have to seek out all the relevant evidence they can; they have to accept that inquiry takes as long as it takes; and of course it’s bizarre to imagine them deciding what’s true by taking a vote, or by asking one person to decide. And time constraints are not relevant.

HU: “The law sometimes asks more of science than science can give, and sometimes gets less from science than the best that science could give,” you write. And you also argue that a simple dichotomy of “scientific inference” vs. “legal reasoning” is more misleading than helpful. Why is this?

SH: I should say, first, that these were remarks about the U.S. legal system, though they probably apply elsewhere too in some degree. (And, once again, they are carefully explained in the papers from which you quote!)

In the U.S. we sometimes find attorneys and judges hoping, for example, that DNA science, which can tell you what the mathematical probability is that this DNA from the crime scene matches the defendant’s DNA by chance, can also tell you how likely it is that the defendant committed the crime; or that epistemological evidence of how high the increased risk of this disorder is among those who have been exposed to a certain drug or chemical can also tell you how likely it is that this plaintiff’s disorder was caused by his exposure. That’s asking too much of science. Sometimes, again, attorneys try to get relevant scientific evidence ruled inadmissible, or drug companies, etc., try to suppress or “spin” unfavorable evidence. So we get less from science than we might.

The second remark was also about the U.S. legal system; in this case, a response to an invitation to talk about precisely this dichotomy—a false one, I believe. First: there is no peculiarly scientific kind of evidence or form of inference; scientists make essentially the same inferences as everyone else—though often their evidence is often far more complex, and sometimes they may use specialized inferential tools, e.g. of statistical reasoning, local to their field.

And second, while there are, at least in common-law countries, distinctively legal forms of reasoning—analogizing and distinguishing this case from previous, arguably precedent, cases, this is not simply a form of arriving at some legal truth; it is a matter of an attorney’s trying to persuade a judge to treat these cases as alike, those as different, or of a court’s offering a rationale for a decision.

HU: Why do people take wrong actions within the scope of freedom and free will? What kind of mechanisms pushes people into crime?

SH: My goodness! There’s too much packed into this question, which really requires a book, not a brief answer!

There’s a vast range of crime and of criminals, from the psychopathic killer to the man who steals food for his starving family. And thinking in the abstract about free will doesn’t seem very helpful; we need to acknowledge both the complexity of most motives and the interactions of genes and environment.

So no one could really give you a good answer; I can only offer a list to illustrate the variety:

• Some people, often called psychopaths, may be genetically wired in unfortunate ways; among these would be some of those who rape, torture, and kill apparently without compunction.
• Others (who may also be genetically susceptible) rape, torture, or kill after themselves being they were abused as children.
• Women suffering severe post-natal depression sometimes kill their newborn children.
• Some steal or embezzle to pay off debts incurred through compulsive gambling, or to buy the drugs to which they are addicted.
• Some of those who become drug-runners or, later, drug-dealers may do so because this is the occupation of the only successful people they know.
• Some park illegally because they are in a hurry and think they can get away with it, or fiddle their taxes because they could use a few more dollars and don’t think the authorities will notice.
• Some steal from desperate need, because otherwise those close to them will starve.
• Some deliberately break a law they believe to be evil, as a protest and in hopes of eventually getting the law changed.
• Some commit acts of terrorism out of religious or political fanaticism.

And this list merely scratches the surface; I haven’t mentions gang-bangers, pimps, child pornographers and their customers, internet scammers, …, etc. etc.—not to mention the well-documented case of the married man who suddenly developed an interest in prepubescent girls—subsequently discovered to be the result of a brain tumor.

HU: What is the legal basis of the oppressive and strict decisions made by the government about individuals’ rights?

SH: Again, a proper answer would take far too much time.

Do you mean, “What is the legal basis of oppressive decisions made by the government”? Or of decisions made by judges? Or what?

Presumably, in every system there is some provision about who makes laws; in the U.S. it is the legislature, the Congress and the Senate (not the executive, which is what I take it “the government” refers to). In every system, I assume, there is also some provision about who interprets and applies the laws; in the U.S., it is judges (again, not the executive).

Having read in the U.S. press about the recent death of Ebru Timtik, I wondered if maybe you were asking about President Erdogan’s urging stronger laws and legal action against activist lawyers. All I was able to find out was that, since the attempted coup by military factions in 2016, under a state of emergency supposed to last only three months, the President has been cracking down not only on banned organizations, but also on lawyers who defend those accused of belonging to them, and even on the Bar Association.

Presumably, the President has some emergency powers; but of course I don’t know how extensive those powers are or, therefore, whether he is exceeding or abusing them. So, while what I read doesn’t sound good, all I can really say without knowing much, much more about the context and the background is, first, that I think it is very important both that the judiciary be independent of the executive branch of government, and that all those accused of breaking the law be competently defended.

HU: Can the legal system be considered as a way of providing justice for all or does jurisprudence render service to the group of people who have economic power?
SH: I have to insist, again, that there is simply no such thing as “the legal system”; there are only the myriad legal systems, subtly or enormously different, around the world. And second, I have to say, as I said about Turkish universities: I know almost nothing, either, about the Turkish legal system, except that it is a civil-law system based on Swiss law, apparently with some covert Islamic overlay.
And if I try to answer your question even with respect to the U.S. system, with which I am more familiar, I’d have to start by distinguishing (i) where there are laws that benefit the well-off; (ii) whether the application of some laws benefits the well-off; and (iii) whether those with more money can deal more successfully with the legal system. I’ll take these questions in reverse order.
The answer to (iii) is clearly, and unsurprisingly, “yes.” With the best will in the world, I don’t see how, practically speaking, the legal system could change this. Our law provides free representation for indigent criminal defendants; but inevitably, public defenders are overworked, underpaid, and not always the cream of the profession—after all, when they need them, the richest people will hire the best lawyers: think of O.J. Simpson’s murder trial, where he employed the legal “dream team,” and was acquitted.

The answer to (ii) is “probably.” For example, it’s sometimes said that heavier penalties for the use of crack cocaine that for heroin disadvantage black people, who are more likely to use the former, than white people, who are more likely to. use the latter; or that the rules about about what scientific evidence is admissible, which can impose very considerable, and expensive, work on plaintiffs in toxic-tort cases—enabling large drug companies, for instance, to prevent the admission of potentially damning evidence.

The answer to (i) is “possibly.” But I know far too little about, for example, the U.S. tax code, inheritance law, or property law to say confidently that these are examples.

HU Many languages have appeared and disappeared during the existence of human beings. Do you think the diversity of languages could affect our world and human history? If there was only one common language, would people still have a tendency to create new languages?

SH: I expect the diversity of languages and dialects does have all kinds of real-world effects—including diplomatic misunderstandings, for example.

I find the idea that there might be only one common language far-fetched, to say the least; but if, per imposibile, there were, I’m pretty sure it would soon evolve differently in different communities. For instance, Latin, once the common language of educated Europeans, eventually evolved into French, Spanish, Catalan, Gallego, Portuguese, Italian, Romanian, etc.

Some simpler examples: when I went to England in 2008 after a decade or so away there were signs I simply didn’t understand—“no fly tipping” for example. And when I lived in England there were idioms specific to quite small areas; e.g., “Is it ’eck as like” (i.e., “like hell it is,” the equivalent of the skeptical American phrase, “yeah, right!”) just in one city, Sheffield. Or think of the fate of Esperanto!
***
It’s been interesting talking to you. But I really think you need to read more extensively and more carefully; and to be more aware of the many different cultures in the world and the ways they gradually shift and evolve over time—legal systems, and so on.

¹ Susan Haack, “Serious Philosophy,” Spazio filsofico 18 (2016): 395-407

²See, e.g., Susan Haack, “The Unity of Truth and the Plurality of Truths” (2005), in Haack, Putting Philosophy to Work: Inquiry and Its Place in Culture (Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books, 2008; second, expanded edition, 2013), 53-68 (text) and 271-73; “Post ‘Post-Truth’: Are We There Yet?” Theoria 85 (2019): 258-75.
³See, e.g., Susan Haack, “How the Critical Common-sensist Sees Things,” Histoire,épistémol¬ogie, langage 16, no.1 (1994): 9-33. Evidence and Inquiry (1993; second, expanded edition, Amherst, NY, 2009), chapter 5.
⁴See, e.g., Susan Hack, “Out of Step: Academic Ethics in a Preposterous Environment,” in Haack, Putting Philosophy to Work: Inquiry and Its Place in Culture, 2nd ed., 2013, 251-68.
5 See, e.g., Susan Haack, “Science as Social? Yes and No” (1996), in Haack, Manifesto of a Passionate Moderate (1998), pp.104-22; “Staying for an answer,” Times Literary Supplement, July 9, 1999: 12-14; Defending Science—Within Reason: Between Scientism and Cynicism (Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books, 2003).

See, e.g., Susan Haack, “The Unity of Truth and the Plurality of Truths” (2005), in Haack, Putting Philosophy to Work: Inquiry and Its Place in Culture (Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books, 2008; second, expanded edition, 2013), 53-68 (text) and 271-73; “Post ‘Post-Truth’: Are We There Yet?” Theoria 85 (2019): 258-75.

6 See, e.g., Susan Haack, “Irreconcilable Differences: “Irreconcilable Differences: The Uneasy Marriage of Science and Law,” Law and Contemporary Problems 72, no.1 (2009): 1-24., reprinted in Haack, Evidence Matters: Science, Proof, and Truth in the Law, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 78-103.
7 See e.g., Susan Haack, “Risky Business: Statistical Proof of Specific Causation,” in Haack, Evidence Matters: Science, Proof, and Truth in the Law, 000-000; “Proof, Probability, and Statistics: The Problem of Delusive Exactness,”
8 See, e.g., Susan Haack, “What’s Wrong with Litigation-Driven Science?” (2008), in Haack, Evidence Matters, 180-207.

9 See Susan Haack, “Scientific Inference vs. Legal Reasoning? Not So Fast!” Anuario de Filosofía y Teoría de Derecho (2019): 193-213.

10 Joakim Parslow, “The Challenge of Turkish Lawyering Associations,” Anthropology of the Middle East, Vol. 13, No. 2, Winter 2018: 26–42 (Berghahn Books), doi:10.3167/ame.2018.130203.
11 Turkey Foreign Law Guide; Ishan Yilmaz, “Secular Law and the Emergence of Unofficial Turkish Islamic Law,” Middle East Journal 56, no.1 (winter, 2002): 113-131.
12 As set by the U.S. Supreme Court in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 587 (1993); Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner 522 U.S. 136, 146 (1997); and Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999).
13 Susan Haack, “The Growth of Meaning and the Limits of Formalism, in Science and Law,” Análisis Filosófico XXIX, no.1 (May 2009): 5-29.
14 Thanks to Mark Migotti for his helpful comments on a draft.

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